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NOTES
DONATIONS - TESTAMENTS - CAPTATION UNDER ARTICLE 1492
Civil Code article 1492 provides: "Proof is not admitted of
the dispositions having been made through hatred, anger, sug-
gestion or captation."' While Louisiana courts have not been
hesitant to apply the article, they have encountered difficulty
in determining what proof is prohibited, particularly under the
term "captation." This Note will undertake an analysis of "cap-
tation" in light of its origin and judicial application.
Under French law prior to the French Civil Code 2 a testa-
mentary disposition could be annulled if it were shown that the
testator was motivated by an unjust angers or as a result of
fraudulent artifices practiced by the legatee to induce the dis-
position.4 The former disposition was stricken on the fiction
that the anger left the testator bereft of reason, 5 while the lat-
ter fell under the notion that the testator's will was not com-
pletely free.6 The fraudulent practices sufficient to annul a dis-
position involved either falsely inspiring in the testator hatred
against his heirs, or generating affection toward the legatee
based on false grounds.7 These practices were termed capta-
tion.8
1. LA. CIVIL CODE art. 1492 (1870).
2. See 3 PLANIOL, CIVIL LAW TREATISE (AN ENGLISH TRANSLATION BY THE
LOUISIANA STATE LAW INSTITUTE) nos. 2877-2885 (1959) ; Cahn, Undue Influ-
ence and Captation: A Comparative Study, 8 TUL. L. REV. 507, 508 (1934);
Comment, 34 TuL. L. REV. 585, 590 (1960). See also Zerega v. Percival, 46 La.
Ann. 590, 15 So. 476 (1894).
3. This was known as the action ab irato. Originally it was limited to forced
heirs of the testator, but later it was extended to cover all collateral heirs. See 3
PLANIOL, CIVIL LAW TREATISE (AN ENGLISH TRANSLATION BY THE LOUISIANA
STATE LAW INSTITUTE) no. 2877 (1959) ; Cahn, Undue Influence and Captation:
A Comparative Study, 8 TUL. L. REV. 507, 508 (1934).
4. This broad phrase is used to describe what was termed fraudulent capta-
tion. For a discussion of the meaning of the term see text accompanying note 14
infra. The requirement that the captation be fraudulent to annul a disposition
is taken from the Louisiana court's appreciation of the French law as expressed
in Zerega v. Percival, 46 La. Ann. 590, 15 So. 476, 481 (1894). See 3 PLANIOL,
CIVIL LAW TREATISE (AN ENGLISH TRANSLATION BY THE LOUISIANA STATE LAW
INSTITUTE) no. 2884 (1959).
5. See Cahn, Undue Influence and Captation: A Comparative Study, 8 TUL.
L. REV. 507, 508 (1934). But see 3 PLANIOL, CIVIL LAW TREATISE (AN ENGLISH
TRANSLATION BY THE LOUISIANA STATE LAW INSTITUTE) no. 2877 (1959).
6. See Comment, 34 TUL. L. REV. 585, 591 (1960).
7. See 3 PLANIOL, CIVIL LAW TREATISE (AN ENGLISH TRANSLATION BY THE
LOUISIANA STATE LAW INSTITUTE) nos. 2880, 2884 (1959). Under this notion,
then, falsely informing the testator that his heirs were preparing to interdict him
or were guilty of some crime would be cause for nullity if it were shown that
the disposition was made under this inducement.
8. Captation has been broadly defined as "the act of one who succeeds in con-
trolling the will of another, so as to become the master of it." Zerega v. Percival,
46 La. Ann. 590, 606, 15 So. 476, 480 (1894). The court gives a further defini-
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The French soon discovered that a rule which allowed nullity
of dispositions for fraudulent captation opened the courts to
scores of litigants who, eager for a share of a testator's estate,
would not hesitate to allege and attempt to prove all manner of
scandal and foul play on the part of legatees.9 To end these
abuses, the Commission for the French Civil Code recommended
an article to prohibit attacks on dispositions based on capta-
tion.'0 Yet, the framers of the French Civil Code, fearful lest
the Code would be said to sanction fraud, deleted the provision,
leaving their Code silent on the subject. 1 Nevertheless, the re-
dactors of the Louisiana Code of 1808 included it,' 2 and it now
appears as article 1492.13
tion which, either in spite of or because of its literary flair, may be helpful:
"Captation takes place by those demonstrations of attachment and friendship,
by those assiduous attentions, by those amenities, by those caresses, by those
ready services, by those officious little presents, usual among friends, and by all
those methods which, ordinarily, render us agreeable to others, and enable us to
secure their good will." Id. at 606, 15 So. at 480. The court was referring, of
course, to captation generally and not to fraudulent captation. For a further
exposition of the term see Succession of Jacobs, 109 La. 1012, 34 So. 59 (1903).
9. Cahn, Undue Influence and Captation: A Comparative Study, 8 TUL. L.
REV. 507, 509 (1934) : "[The rule] . . . led to numerous scandalous litigations, in
which family controversies, private relations, and marital difficulties of a confi-
dential order were paraded for the benefit of the idly curious, the malicious, and
the purveyor of material for blackmailing. Spouses who had masked their differ-
ences throughout a lifetime of discretion, found the veil of secrecy torn rudely
aside. Reputations maintained honorably for long years were blasted without need
or end. The courts discovered themselves an asylum for petty grievances and
fancied wrongs; the law became a repository of scandal and salacity." See Zerega
v. Percival, 46 La. Ann. 590, 15 So. 476 (1894).
10. The article, as quoted in Comment, 34 Tun. L. REv. 585 n.40 (1960),
reads: "La loi n'admet point la preuve que la disposition n'a dt faites qua par
haine, col6re, suggestion ou captation." A different version of the article is quoted
in Cahn, Undue Influence and Captation: A Comparative Study, 8 TUL. L. REV.
507, 509 (1934) : "La loi n'admet pas que la preuve la disposition n'a td faite
que par haine, colgre, suggestion ou captation." The French text of the article,
as incorporated into La. Civil Code art. 18, p. 213 (1808) reads as follows: "On
n'admet point la preuve, que la disposition ait td faite par haine, coldre, sugges-
tion on captation." 3 LOUISIANA LEOAL ARCHIVES, COMPILED EDITION OF THE
CIVIL CODES OF LOUISIANA 819 (1940).
The article also prohibited proof of dispositions having been made through
hatred, anger, and suggestion. This Note is limited to a discussion of captation,
though most of the material applies equally to the other terms.
The term "suggestion" has been given several meanings. The court in Zerega
v. Percival indicates that the term is "often used as a synonym for 'captation,'
but it is applied specially to those means of persuasion employed to alter the will
of a testator, and to prompt him to make a disposition different from that which
he had in view." Zerega v. Percival, 46 La. Ann. 590, 606, 15 So. 476, 481
(1894). See 3 PLANIOL, CIVIL LAW TREATISE (AN ENGLISH TRANSLATION BY
THE LOUISIANA STATE LAW INSTITUTE) nos. 2880-2884 (1959).
1 11. See Cahn, Undue Influence and Captation: A Comparative Study, 8 TUL.
L. REV. 507, 509 (1934). See also 3 PLANIOL, CIVIL LAW TREATISE (AN ENG-
LISH TRANSLATION BY THE LOUISIANA STATE LAW INSTITUTE) no. 2883 n.21
(1959).
12. La. Civil Code art. 18, p. 212 (1808).
13. The article did not appear in the projet to the Code of 1825, though it was
placed in that code as article 1479. See 3 LOUISIANA LEGAL ARCHIVES, COMPILED
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The scope of the prohibition of article 1492 seems clear in
light of its French source. The dispositions which were tainted
under the jurisprudence were those in which the testator had
an active desire to dispose to the particular legatee; the nullity
was declared only because of a fault in his motive for so exer-
cising his free will. Under article 1492 a testator's motivation
for disposing and the acts which induced this motive are not to
be impugned when there was an active desire by the testator to
make the disposition. And, a fortiori, article 1492 has no appli-
cation whenever the disposition is not one which the testator
was desirous of making as, for example, a disposition made
under duress or threats of violence. 14
The early Louisiana decisions 15 seemed to recognize the scope
of article 1492 set out above. However, later cases have made
statements so broad that they in fact obscure these distinctions.
Thus it has been stated that the article prohibits proof of du-
ress,16 force, 7 violence,1 8 and all acts, conduct or motives of the
testator.19 Nevertheless these decisions contain statements en-
tirely consistent with the clear import of the article,20 and the
EDITION OF THE CIVIL CODES OF LOUISIANA 819 (1940).
14. A good example of the allegations which would come under the scope of
the article is found in Succession of Price, 172 La. 606, 134 So. 907 (1931).
There the plaintiff sought annulment on the grounds that the legatee used his
influence to prejudice the testator against his family and ingratiate himself in her
affections for the purpose of securing the property for himself. The court held,
properly, that proof of these allegations were prohibited under article 1492.
15. E.g., Texada v. Spence, 166 La. 1020, 118 So. 120 (1928) ; Succession of
Jacobs, 109 La. 1012, 34 So. 59 (1903) ; Zerega v. Percival, 46 La. Ann. 590, 15
So. 476 (1894). The decisions are collected in Cahn, Undue Influence and Cap-
tation: A Comparative Study, 8 TUL. L. REv. 507, 512-16 (1934) ; Comment, 34
TUL. L. REV. 585, 590-97 (1960).
16. E.g., Cormier v. Myers, 223 La. 259, 65 So. 2d 345 (1953) ; Succession
of Yeates, 213 La. 541, 35 So. 2d 210 (1948).
17. E.g., Cormier v. Myers, 223 La. 259, 65 So. 2d 345 (1953).
18. E.g., Zerega v. Percival, 46 La. Ann. 590, 15 So. 476 (1894).
19. E.g., Succession of Schlumbrecht, 138 La. 173, 70 So. 76 (1915). Other
terminology has been used by the courts, particularly the common law phrase
"undue influence." The common law surrounding that term is different from the
civil law approach under article 1492 (see Comment, 34 TUL. L. REV. 585, 586
(1960)), but the court in Zerega v. Percival, 46 La. Ann. 590, 15 So. 476 (1894)
seemed to indicate that an allegation of undue influence would be taken as an
allegation of captation or suggestion and treated accordingly.
20. Most of the cases merely cite Zerega, quoting large portions of that
opinion with approval. E.g., Succession of Franz, 232 La. 310, 94 So. 2d 270
(1957) ; Succession of Yeates, 213 La. 541, 35 So. 2d 210 (1948) ; Succession of
Schlumbrecht, 138 La. 173, 70 So. 76 (1915). The difficulty in ascribing weight
to the statements made by the courts arises out of the fact that the evidence
proffered is not shown in the opinions. Thus there appears to be no way of
knowing whether the parties were indeed attempting to show duress or violence.
The problem is more serious in the cases in which the court has stricken allega-
tions of duress and violence on an exception of no cause of action. It would seem
that such an exception could not be maintained under article 1492 if the petition
alleged, for example, duress or violence.
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inconsistent pronouncements may be mere indiscreet choices of
words. It seems unthinkable that the court would not annul a
disposition shown to be made under fear of harm or other
duress.21
Dicta in certain cases indicate that there is an exception to
article 1492 which admits proof of captation when the conduct
has taken place at the time of the execution of the will. 22 The
rule is derived from statements made in an early case, Godden
v. Executors of Burke,23 but analysis of that case reveals no
basis for the exception. There the court was not speaking of
testaments generally, but of the will made by authentic act. The
evidence was proffered not to annul the disposition for capta-
tion, but for lack of compliance with the requirements of form24
for a nuncupative will by public act.25 Thus it appears that the
court held merely that 1492 did not prohibit proof of matters
tending to show that the formalities required by law for the
execution of a nuncupative will by public act were not fol-
lowed. 20 Further, the present rule does not appear to be con-
sonant with article 1492. If captation means fraudulent induce-
ments by someone to encourage the testator to make a certain
disposition to him, 27 there seems no logical reason to predicate
admissibility vel non on the time of occurrence of the acts. It is
submitted that an inducement made at the execution of the will
is no more grievous than one made prior thereto. Of course, as
a practical matter captation at the execution of the will is more
susceptible of linkage with the reason for the disposition. Nev-
ertheless, article 1492 and the policy behind it do not suggest
such a distinction, 28 and it is submitted that it is not justified.
21. For an exhaustive study of the jurisprudence, see Cahn, Undue Influence
and Captation: A Comparative Study, 8 TuL. L. REV. 507, 512-16 (1934) ; Com-
ment, 34 TUL. L. REV. 585, 590-97 (1960).
22. E.g., Succession of Franz, 232 La. 310, 94 So. 2d 270 (1957) ; Texada v.
Spence, 166 La. 1020, 118 So. 120 (1928) ; Zerega v. Percival, 46 La. Ann. 590,
15 So. 476 (1894). But see Succession of Hernandez, 138 La. 134, 70 So. 63
(1915).
23. 35 La. Ann. 160 (1883).
24. See LA. CIVIL CODE arts. 1574-1604 (1870).
25. The question was whether the will could be annulled because it was not
dictated to the notary.
26. The court stated: "It is an error to suppose that (article 1492) . . . was
designed to prevent the admission of proof to establish the circumstances which
transpire at the making of an authentic will, under charges tending to the nullity
of the act, for want of compliance with the exigencies of the law." (Emphasis
added.) Godden v. Executors of Burke, 35 La. Ann. 160, 163 (1883).
27. See text accompanying note 14 supra.
28. However, if the courts have interpreted article 1492 to include violence,
force, and fraud in the execution of a will, the rule may have some merit because
of the fact that these actions usually occur at the making of the will.
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NOTES
Proof of captation has been admitted in recent Louisiana
cases to show testamentary incapacity, 29 possibly on the theory
that the susceptibility of the testator to such pressure tends to
show incapacity. 0 Perhaps this rule can be logically distin-
guished from the prohibition of article 1492,'3 1 but it is submitted
that its application completely undermines the purpose of this
article, which is to protect against divulgence of scandalous mat-
ter and multitudinous attacks on testaments. 2 Proof of capta-
tion is prohibited not because captation is socially desirable but
because, as a policy consideration, it was considered better to
protect the innocent legatee from spurious attacks than to de-
prive the guilty one of his legacy. However, when the article
can be circumvented by an allegation of testamentary incapac-
ity, the doors to litigation have been opened once more.3 3 How-
ever, it is certainly arguable that the policy behind ascertaining
whether a will was made by a person of sound mind outweighs
the possibility of thwarting the policy underlying article 1492.
In conclusion, it may be said that the decisions relating to
article 1492 are not entirely satisfactory. The courts, never hav-
ing been squarely presented with many of the issues, have al-
lowed gratuitous pronouncements to confuse the actual mean-
ings of the terms used in the article. It is submitted that when
the court has an opportunity to consider the article again, it
should distinguish sharply between fraudulent captation and
duress, force, and violence; it should consider the present-at-the-
execution exception in the light of this distinction; and it should
re-evaluate admissibility to prove incapacity in light of policy
considerations.
Anthony J. Correro III
29. Succession of Franz, 232 La. 310, 94 So. 2d 270 (1957) ; Cormier v. Myers,
223 La. 259, 65 So. 2d 345 (1953) ; Succession of Andrews, 153 So. 2d 470 (La.
App. 4th Cir. 1963) ; Succession of Willis, 149 So. 2d 218 (La. App. 2d Cir.
1963).
30. At least this is the reason suggested by the author of Comment, 34 TuL.
L. REV. 585 (1960).
31. Article 1492 prohibits proof of dispositions made through captation. In
cases in which the evidence is offered to show incapacity, an attempt is made to
prove that the will was made through insanity.
32. See text accompanying note 10 supra.
33. In Succession of Andrews, 153 So. 2d 470 (La. App. 4th Cir. 1963) the
court admitted testimony to the effect that "testator gradually became subjected
to her (the legatee) dominance and control and was brow-beaten or persuaded
by her to leave more and more to her at the expense of his collaterals." Id. at
472. This would appear to be the very evidence prohibited by 1492 under the
policy of prohibiting scandalous litigation.
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